Page 64 - Msingi Afrika Magazine Issue 22

Food Health

carbon that would not otherwise be
sequestered. Suppose a programme
is launched in an area where farm-
ers had already started planting
cover crops for other reasons (for
example, restoring soil health). In
that case, it will not be possible to
determine how much “additional”
planting of cover crops is due to the
programme. This is particularly true
for the corporate programmes since
they rely almost exclusively on farms
adopting practices, like cover crops
and reduced tillage. However, many
farmers were already adopting them
without the carbon schemes and
are likely to adopt these practices as
other incentives come into being, Insolo’s soybean farm in Piaui, Brazil. Photo: Insolo
like public programmes or new
markets for cover crops. In Brazil,
for instance, the government claims
to have already converted 8 million luting corporate food system. to sign-up to the apps of agribusi-
hectares to no-till through an emis- ness companies, and programmes
sions reduction plan that provides Given all of these problems, there is that operate independently are
low-interest loans to participating simply no way that the carbon that rapidly being bought up. Moreover,
farmers-- without the need for car- these programmes claim to seques- these platforms, as well as the re-
bon credits. ter in the soil can be equated with mote verification systems, are often
concrete, reductions in greenhouse based on partnerships with big tech
And then, there is the issue of the gas emissions. And yet agribusiness companies, like Microsoft and IBM,
greenhouse gases these carbon corporations continue to steamroll who are themselves major buyers of
credit farming programmes gener- ahead with more projects, while cli- carbon credits. The companies in-
ate. Nearly all the programmes focus mate polluters like Shell and Nestlé tend to make their digital platforms
narrowly on quantifying carbon eagerly buy up the credits-- and the one-stop shops for carbon credits,
sequestered in the soil and do not EU, the US, Brazil and other gov- seeds, pesticides and fertilizers and
consider the overall emissions that ernments look to emulate Australia agronomic advice, all supplied by
industrial farming produces. They and make these programmes part of the company, which gets the added
do not factor in the amount of their national climate plans (see Box benefit of control over the data har-
chemical inputs a farm applies or on Australia). vested from the participating farms.
the amount of fossil fuels burnt
running tractors and other machin- A global soil grab Farmers, on the other hand, have lit-
ery, or the increased emissions that tle to gain. The carbon sequestered
can result from the first years of The corporate interest in carbon payments per tonne do not justify
transition to no-till. They do not farming extends beyond simply the added costs unless you farm on
account for the emissions produced greenwashing industrial agriculture thousands of hectares. At the farm
by their remote verification systems or offsetting emissions. It provides a level, those best placed to benefit
either-- from the energy needed to powerful incentive to draw farmers from these programmes are the pen-
store the data these systems gen- into the digital platforms that agri- sion funds and billionaires who have
erate to the aeroplanes or satellites business corporations and big tech been buying up large farmland areas
they use to monitor farms. And they companies are jointly developing to in recent years. It provides them
are based on tweaks to a model of influence farmers on their choice with an additional potential revenue
industrial agriculture that depends of inputs and farming practices. stream and can be factored into the
heavily on chemical inputs and that [18]Most corporate carbon farming asset value of their lands. It can
supplies a hugely wasteful and pol- programmes already require farmers also be added to their portfolio of

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